混合所有制改革对盈余管理的治理效应

Governance Effect of Mixed Ownership Reform on Earnings Management

混合所有制改革目标之一是健全公司治理,盈余管理是公司治理重点控制的对象。本文从盈余管理视角,基于渐进性DID模型,检验新一轮混合所有制改革对国有企业的治理效应。研究发现:混合所有制改革有助于减少盈余管理,且受企业功能属性、地区市场化水平的影响;即使在强盈余管理动机下,该治理效应仍然有效;进一步检验非国有股东的调节作用,发现非国有大股东制衡度与机构投资者持股能够强化混合所有制改革对盈余管理的抑制作用,而股东多样性则无助于这一效应的发挥;最后从内部控制与企业价值层面分别探讨混合所有制改革对盈余管理治理效应的渠道机制及其经济后果。基于上述结论,本文从提高混合股权治理效应、强化国企分类管理、发挥市场机制、关注盈余管理方向等方面给出政策建议。

One of the goals of the mixed ownership reform is to improve corporate governance, as earnings management is the key target of corporate governance control. From the perspective of earnings management, based on the progressive DID model,the article examines the governance effect of a new round of mixed ownership reform on state-owned enterprises. The results show that: mixed reform helps to reduce earnings management, which is affected by the corporate functional attributes and the regional marketization level;even with strong earnings management motivation, mixed ownership reform can still exert a significant governance effect on earnings management;by further testing the regulatory role of non-state-owned shareholders, the article finds that the checks and balances of non-state-owned major shareholders and institutional investors’ shareholding can strengthen the inhibitory effect of mixed ownership reform on earnings management, while the diversity of shareholders does not help to play this effect. Finally, this article discusses the mechanism of action and economic consequences between mixed ownership reform and earnings management from the perspective internal control and enterprise value. Based on the above conclusions, this article gives policy recommendations from improving the governance of mixed equity, strengthening the classified management of state-owned enterprises, exerting market mechanisms, and focusing on the direction of earnings management.