考虑政府双重角色的排污权二级市场交易行为演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emission Permit Trading Behaviors in the Secondary Market by Considering Government’s Dual Role

针对地方政府与交易企业间由于不同利益诉求导致的排污权交易冲突问题,构建了排污权交易过程中具有有限理性的三方主体之间的演化博弈模型,分析交易过程中各方主体行为的动态演化过程,从复制动态方程解的稳定性角度解释了地方政府干预二级市场价格和企业行为的做法不可持续且难以真正促进排污权交易发展的原因。结果表明:系统的演化结果具有多种情形,三方合作情景下,地方政府选择协调角色,能否达到理想演化稳定策略依赖于两类企业的初始交易意愿。仿真结果表明:高于0.1的初始交易意愿是保障,且随着交易意愿的增加,演化收敛的速度越快。在一般情形下,对系统中各损益变量的参数值进行仿真分析。最后,提出保证排污权交易进一步有效发展的政策建议,包括优化排污权交易制度,降低地方政府选择干预角色的可能性,提高企业交易活跃度。

Considering the emissions trading conflicts between local governments and trading companies caused by different interest demands,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model among the three parties with bounded rationality in the process of emission right trading.And then,it analyses the evolution process and the evolutionary equilibrium.From the perspective of the stability of the solution of the replication dynamic equation,it explains the reason why the local government′s intervention in the price of the secondary market and the behavior of enterprises is not sustainable and it is difficult to promote the development of emission trading.Results show that the system evolution of the results with a variety of situations,the tripartite cooperation situation,local governments choose coordinating role,can achieve ideal evolutionary stable strategy depends on the two types of enterprises of the initial transaction will.The simulation results show that the initial trading above 0.1 will is the guarantee,and with the increase of trade will,evolution and the faster convergence.Under the general situation,simulations on the values of profit and loss variables are implemented for the game system.In the end,it proposes some policy implications to promote the further development of emissions trading based on simulation results,which includes not only decreasing the possibility of local government choosing interfering role by optimizing thetop-level design of emissions trading but also improving the activation of trading companies.