融资约束、委托代理与企业投资行为的异化——基于我国上市房地产企业的实证度量

Financing Constraints,Principal Agent and Enterprise Investment Alienation——An Empirical Measurement Based on Listed Real Estate Enterprises in China

以我国136家上市房地产企业2012年到2019年的数据为样本,将融资约束和委托代理纳入同一框架,构建双边随机边界模型,探究两者综合效应对企业最优投资规模的影响。研究结果显示,融资约束对上市房地产企业投资行为具有重要影响,同时代理成本对投资支出的影响略高于融资约束,融资约束不能完全抵消代理成本的影响;融资约束和代理成本的双重影响导致上市房地产企业的投资规模偏离最优水平在5%—10%之间,大部分企业存在较为严重的投资异化问题;国有企业比非国有企业更容易存在投资过度现象。为有效解决企业投资异化问题,促进房地产行业的长期平稳健康发展,企业可以通过完善信息披露制度、生产经营管理制度等方式弱化代理冲突,政府可以通过完善相关法律条款、调控税率等途径减少融资约束。

In order to effectively control the optimal investment scale of enterprises,this paper puts financing constraints and principal agent into the same framework to build a bilateral stochastic boundary model.Based on the data of 136 samples of listed real estate enterprises in China from 2012 to 2019,this paper empirically measures the impact of the comprehensive effects of financing constraints and principal agent on the optimal investment scale.The results are as follows:financing constraints have an important impact on the investment behavior of listed real estate enterprises,and the impact of agency cost on investment expenditure is slightly higher than that of financing constraints.The dual effects of financing constraints and agency costs cause the financing scale of listed real estate enterprises to deviate from the optimal level between 5%and 10%,and most enterprises are faced with serious investment alienation.Enterprises can reduce agency conflict by improving production and operation system,while the government can reduce financing constraints by improving relevant legal provisions and fiscal policies.