回收率奖惩下考虑产能约束的闭环供应链制造商合作策略

Manufacture's cooperation strategy in closed-loop supply chain considering capacity constraints with recycling rate reward and punishment mechanism

为了研究具有产能约束的闭环供应链中回收率奖惩机制对制造商合作策略的影响,构建了由单一制造商、零售商和回收商组成的闭环供应链模型,运用Stackelberg博弈理论进行分析。研究发现:当奖惩力度较大时,制造商更倾向于与回收商合作;反之,其合作倾向与产能大小有关。此外,奖惩力度的增大会削弱产能变化对不同合作模式下的回收率等相关决策变量的大小关系的影响,同时也会加剧或缓解不同合作模式在特定产能条件下对消费剩余可能产生的负面影响。

To study the influence of government recycling rate reward and punishment intervention on manufacturer's cooperation strategy in the closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraints,a closed-loop supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a recycler was constructed,and Stackelberg game theory was applied to analyze.The study showed that the manufacturers preferred to cooperate with recyclers when the government's rewards and punishments coefficient were large;conversely,manufacturers'cooperative tendencies were related to the size of production capacity.In addition,the increase in reward and punishment coefficient would weaken the impact of changes in production capacity on the relationship between decision-making variables such as the recovery rate under different cooperation models,and would aggravate or mitigate the negative impact of different cooperation models on the consumption surplus under certain production capacity conditions at the same time.