央行言辞沟通与企业短贷长投

The Central Bank’s Verbal Communication and Corporate Long-term Investment with Short-term Financing

央行言辞沟通作为一种预期管理政策,越来越受到重视和运用,而我国存在较为严重的短贷长投现象。运用中国人民银行言辞沟通指数和上市公司财务数据,研究央行言辞沟通对企业短贷长投的影响,发现宽松的言辞沟通显著提高企业短贷长投程度,且言行一致时这种效应更加明显。进一步研究发现,企业产权性质对二者关系起到调节作用,宽松的言辞沟通对国有企业短贷长投的促进作用更加明显。研究结论从央行预期管理角度为治理企业短贷长投提供了新的启示。

Using the verbal communication index of the People’s Bank of China and the financial data of listed companies,this paper studies the influence of the central bank’s verbal communication on the corporate long-term investment with short-term financing and found that easing verbal communication significantly improves the degree of long-term investment with short-term financing,and the effect is very obvious when words and actions are consistent,and then through further research found that the enterprise property has a moderating effect on the relationship between the short-term loan and long-term investment,and the easing communication has a more obvious promoting effect on short-term loan and long-term investment of state-owned enterprises.From the perspective of central bank’s expectation management,the conclusion of this paper provides new enlightenment for the governance of long-term investment with short-term financing.