公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

A Research on Supply Chain Coordination of Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Bilateral Fresh-keeping Efforts under Fairness Concern

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对"批发价格+转移支付"的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于"批发价格+转移支付"的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。

In the supply chain of fresh agricultural products dominated by the supplier, considering the level of freshkeeping efforts of both the supplier and the retailer and the efforts will affect the freshness and market demand of fresh agricultural products, a Stackelberg game model was set to analyze the impact of retailer’s fairness concern on the bilateral fresh-keeping effort level and supply chain coordination. The principal-agent model was applied to design a combined contract based on "wholesale price + transfer payment" in order to increase the overall benefit and stability of the supply chain and better coordinate the interest of both the supplier and the retailer. Research shows that the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain of fresh agricultural product whether the retailer is concerned about fairness, and the retailer’s fairness concern further reduces the level of bilateral fresh-keeping efforts and further deviates the supply chain from optimal status. Finally, the combined contract based on "wholesale price + transfer payment" can not only achieve the optimal solution of bilateral fresh-keeping efforts and the coordination of fresh agricultural products supply chain, but also achieve Pareto profit improvement of each supply chain members.