需求信息不对称下考虑风险规避制造商的供应链决策研究

Supply chain decisions:A risk-averse manufacturer under demand information asymmetry

本文研究在制造商和平台零售商需求信息不对称情况下,平台零售商进行绿色服务的信息共享策略选择问题。建立一个由平台为主导者,制造商为跟随者的Stackelberg模型。平台预测需求信息,并决定是否共享。通过对比共享信息和不共享信息两种策略,发现当制造商趋向风险中性或风险规避程度较高时,平台共享信息。同时,风险规避因子影响信息共享价值。当风险规避因子增加时,制造商信息共享价值先增后减,而平台信息共享价值先减后增。此外,当平台佣金比例较低时,共享信息对制造商和供应链有利。其次,虽然共享信息策略下的消费者剩余减少,但当风险规避因子适中时,社会福利提高。因此,考虑供应链效用和社会福利,当风险规避因子适中且平台佣金比例较低时,共享信息有利。最后,本文考虑成本分担合同对供应链成员的影响,发现在共享信息策略或风险规避因子较低的不共享信息策略下,成本分担合同对供应链及其成员有利。此外,成本分担合同提高消费者剩余和社会福利。

With the development and promotion of big data technology,e-commerce platforms can collect product data information timeously and effectively and then forecast product demand.Effective demand forecasting information can mitigate the adverse effects of demand fluctuations.However,because the manufacturer is not close to the market,accurate demand information may not be available.Therefore,a demand information asymmetry problem exists between the manufacturer and the e-commerce platform.In a supply chain with asymmetric demand information,the critical question is whether the e-commerce platform is willing to share demand information with the manufacturer.Also,the contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection is becoming increasingly prominent.Given the influence of policies and customer environmental awareness,increasingly,e-commerce platforms are willing to focus on the development of green e-commerce.Therefore,in the context of an e-commerce retail platform’s green service,this paper builds a Stackelberg model with a platform retailer as the leader and with the manufacturer as the follower.First,this paper considers two strategies:information sharing strategy and non-information sharing strategy under the agency contract.When the platform retailer shares demand forecast information,the demand information of both members(leader and follower)is symmetrical,and the manufacturer is risk-neutral.When the platform retailer does not share demand forecast information with the manufacturer,the demand information of both members is asymmetric,and the manufacturer is risk-averse.Under the noninformation sharing strategy,this paper uses the mean-variance method to measure the manufacturer’s risk-averse behavior.Based on the two strategies of information sharing strategy and non-information sharing strategy,this paper solves game models and obtains the equilibrium solutions for the manufacturer and the platform retailer.The results demonstrate that under the non-information sharing strategy,when the manufacturer trends to risk aversion,the optimal price and the green service level decrease.Then,this paper compares and analyzes two information sharing strategies and reaches the following conclusions.First,when the platform commission ratio increases,the price and the green service level increase under the information sharing strategy.Under the non-information sharing strategy,if the green service is efficient and the risk aversion factor is low,the price and green service level increase as the platform commission ratio increases.When the risk aversion factor is moderate,the price decreases and the green service level increases as the platform commission ratio increases.When the risk aversion factor is high,the price and the green service level decrease.If the green service is inefficient,the price and green service level will increase as the platform commission ratio increases.Second,when the platform retailer’s green service is less efficient,the price and green service level decrease under the information sharing strategy.Under the non-information sharing strategy,when the risk aversion factor is low,with the efficiency of the green service gradually becoming inefficient,the price and the green service level decrease.When the risk aversion factor is moderate,with the efficiency of the green service gradually becoming inefficient,the price increases and the green service level decreases.When the risk aversion factor is high,the inefficient green service efficiency leads to a higher price and a higher green service level.Third,this paper finds the conditions for the platform retailer to share demand information.When the risk aversion factor is low or high,the platform retailer chooses to share demand information.Also,the risk aversion factor has an important impact on the value of information sharing.When the risk aversion factor is low and the risk aversion factor increases,the manufacturer’s value of information sharing will increase,and the platform retailer’s value of information sharing will decrease.When the risk aversion factor is moderate,the manufacturer’s and the platform retailer’s value of information sharing improves as the risk aversion factor increases.When the risk aversion factor is high,an increase in the risk aversion factor will damage the manufacturer’s value of information sharing,but it will benefit the platform retailer’s value of information sharing.Further,this paper analyzes the consumer surplus and social welfare under two information sharing strategies.The results find that consumer surplus is higher under the non-information sharing strategy.The numerical analysis finds that when the platform commission ratio is low,the information sharing strategy benefits the manufacturer and the supply chain system.Whereas,when the risk aversion factor is moderate,social welfare improves under the information sharing strategy.Therefore,considering supply chain utility and social welfare,when the risk aversion factor is moderate and the platform commission ratio is low,the platform retailer should share the demand information.Finally,this paper assumes that both players share the cost of the green service provided by the platform retailer.Under the cost-sharing contract,this paper analyzes the two strategies of information sharing strategy and non-information sharing strategy.The results find that under the information sharing strategy or a lower risk aversion factor and non-information sharing strategy,the costsharing contract benefits the supply chain and the members.This paper finds that the cost-sharing contract improves consumer surplus and social welfare.Additionally,the main conclusions of this paper have not changed substantially under the cost-sharing contract,and the findings are robust.