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消防安全告知承诺管理中的核查策略博弈分析

Game Analysis of Verification Strategy in Fire SafetyNotification Commitment Management
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摘要 为厘清消防安全告知承诺管理中消防监管部门与公共场所管理部门的策略选择机制,本文运用演化博弈理论,构建告知承诺管理背景下的双方现场核查博弈模型,并对双方博弈系统演化方向和均衡点的稳定性进行分析;然后利用Matlab软件模拟双方在“不严格核查、失实承诺”、震荡无稳定策略、“严格核查、失实承诺”以及“不严格核查、如实承诺”4类情形下现场核查博弈演化过程,分析双方策略选择的原因和趋势,讨论影响演化博弈过程的因素。结果表明:消防监管部门的核查力度和公共场所管理部门如实承诺的程度,以及消防监管部门的核查组织成本、信息公开的社会收益、上级消防监管部门的处罚、公共场所管理部门的消防安全投入成本、场所受到行政处罚和相关经营损失等是双方策略选择的影响因素;公共场所的经营收入与消防监管部门制定标准、审核承诺的组织成本不是双方策略选择的影响因素。 In order to clarify the strategic selection mechanism of fire safety notification commitment management between the fire supervision department and the public place management department,in this paper,the evolutionary game theory was used to construct the on-site verification game model of both sides under the background of notification commitment management.The evolution direction of the game system and the stability of equilibrium point of both sides were analyzed.Matlab software was used to simulate the evolution of the on-site verification game in the four situations of"not strict verification,false promises",shock and instability strategies,"strict verification,false promises"and"not strict verifications,truthful promises".Then,the reasons and trends of the two parties'strategy choices and the factors affecting the evolutionary game process were discussed.The results show that the inspection efforts of the fire supervision department and the degree of truthful commitment of the public place management department,as well as the inspection organization cost of the fire supervision department,the social benefits of information disclosure,the punishment of the superior fire supervision department,the fire safety investment cost of the public place management department,and the place's administrative penalties and related operating losses are factors that influence the strategic choices of both parties.The operating income of public places and the organization cost of formulating standards and auditing commitments set by the fire supervision department are not factors influencing the strategic choices of both parties.
作者 王冠鹏 孙洛浦 WANG Guanpeng;SUN Luopu(Daqing Fire Rescue Detachment,Daqing Heilongjiang 163000,China)
出处 《安全》 2021年第10期68-73,共6页 Safety & Security
关键词 消防安全 告知承诺 演化博弈理论 影响因素 fire safety notification commitment evolutionary game theory influence factor
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