资产评估机构对商誉泡沫的影响及机制研究

The Impact and Mechanism of Appraisal Institutions on Goodwill Bubble

以2013~2019年我国A股上市公司发生的并购事件为样本,分析资产评估机构对并购商誉的影响及其内在机理。研究发现,有资产评估机构参与的并购事件产生的超额商誉更低,且后续期间商誉减值计提比例也更低。由此表明,资产评估机构能够抑制商誉泡沫。机制检验发现,上述影响以评估准确度的提升和声誉约束对管理层代理问题的缓解为实现路径。以资产评估准则出台为政策冲击的PSM-DID检验在控制了内生性问题后,仍支持上述结论。拓展性研究发现,并购方以往并购经验、内部控制质量和外部市场环境,均会显著影响资产评估机构对商誉泡沫的抑制作用。

Based on the M&A events of China’s A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2019, this study analyzes the impact of appraisal institutions on M&A goodwill and its internal mechanism. It is found that the M&A events with the participation of asset appraisal institutions show lower excess goodwill, and the proportion of goodwill impairment in subsequent periods is also lower, which indicates that appraisal institutions can inhibit goodwill bubbles. Mechanism test shows that the improvement of evaluation accuracy and the mitigation of reputation constraints of appraisal institutions to the management agency problem are the paths to achieve the above effects. The PSM-DID test, which takes the introduction of appraisal standards as the policy impact, still supports the above conclusion after controlling the endogenous problems. Extensive research has found that mergers and acquisitions experience, internal control quality and external market environment will significantly affect the inhibitory effect of appraisal institutions on goodwill bubbles.