马里翁对笛卡尔“我思”概念的两次颠倒:两种不同的呼唤结构

Jean-Luc Marion’s Two Inversions of Descartes’"Cogito"Argument:Two Different Vocative Structures

当代法国哲学家马里翁主要在《自我与上帝:进一步的笛卡尔问题》和《既给予:通向一种被给予性的现象学》中讨论了笛卡尔的"我思"概念。两次讨论从表面上看似乎并无联系,因为这属于马里翁的两个研究领域:笛卡尔研究和现象学研究。有的学者即使注意到了两次讨论之间的联系,但也只是从外部相似性来描述。实际上,这二者之间遵循着一条内部线索,即"从限制性到非限制性,从外在性到内在性",并且马里翁对"我思"概念作了两次颠倒。在第一次颠倒中马里翁提出了"他者的呼唤-自我"的结构,但碍于笛卡尔的形而上学因素并不彻底;而在第二次颠倒中,马里翁遵循"自身给予的呼唤-沉醉者"的结构,通过被给予性活动克服了形而上学的"我思"困境。

Jean-Luc Marion as a contemporary French philosopher mainly discussed Descartes’"cogito"argument in On the Ego and on God:Further Cartesian Question and Being Given:Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness.On the surface,the two discussions seem to be unrelated,because they belong to Marion’s two research fields:Descartes research and phenomenological research.Even if some scholars discussed the connection between the two studies,they only described it from the external similarity.In fact,this article believes that these two studies follow an internal clue—from restrictive condition to non-restrictive condition and from externality to internality.And Marion has reversed cogito argument twice.This article attempts to point out that Marion proposed the structure of"the call of the other—ego"in the first inversion,but due to Descartes’s metaphysical factors,it was not thorough.In the second inversion,Marion followed the structure of"the call of giving itself—the devoted"and overcame the metaphysical dilemma of"cogito"by given activities.