摘要
对一个地方试验区的调研发现,金融惠农政策实施效果不理想源于一系列制度环境障碍。具体表现在:合作金融的制度成本高,竞争优势低;农户的房地资产交易难,他们手中真正可以使用的贷款抵押物贫乏;人际担保的抵押方式有悖社会伦理,而基于个人信用获得贷款又有赖于信息系统的全面建设。这些制度条件的系统性作用,"激励"了各方规避风险的反应,结果造就了银行有钱不敢贷和农户缺钱难贷并存的现象。任由一个正确的政策无效,还是改进制度,增强相融性激励,降低农业产业的活动成本,让金融惠农政策发挥出作用,我们面临着行动选择。
Research in one local pilot area found that the unsatisfactory implementation of financial policies aimed at benefiting the farmers stems from a series of institutional barriers.Specifically,these are:the cooperative finance has high institutional costs and few competitive advantages;it is difficult for farmers to trade housing and land assets,and they have little real loan collateral they can actually use;collateral in the form of interpersonal guarantees runs counter to social ethics;and access to loans based on personal credit depends on a comprehensive information system.The systemic effect of these institutional conditions has"incentivized"risk-averse responses,resulting in a situation where banks are afraid to lend money and farmers have trouble borrowing money.We are faced with a choice of action between letting a sound policy be ineffective or improving the system to increase the consistency of incentives,reduce the cost of activity in the agricultural industry and make financial policies targeting the farmers play their due role.
出处
《中国社会科学评价》
CSSCI
2021年第3期22-31,157,共11页
China Social Science Review
基金
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“发展中的社会治理:理念,知识与方法”(16JJD840003)支持。