腐败治理与城投债信用风险:基于中纪委地区巡视的分析

Anti-Corruption and Credit Risk of Chengtou Bonds:A Quasi-Natural Experiment on Regional Inspection of the CPC’s CCDI

本文从腐败治理视角探讨城投债信用风险成因和化解的路径,以2013-2014年中纪委开展的地区巡视作为外生冲击,考察中央政府主导的腐败治理如何影响城投债信用风险。研究发现,中纪委地区巡视显著降低了被巡视地区城投债信用利差,这种降低作用在腐败程度较高、行政级别较低、财政透明度较差的地区以及采用抵押或质押担保方式的城投债中表现得更为明显。本研究结论表明,地方政府腐败是中国城投债信用风险累积的重要原因,而中央政府主导的腐败治理能在一定程度上降低这种信用风险。

In recent years,the significant credit risk of Chengtou bonds in China has been a very worrying issue for both the government and academia.Circumventing and defusing the risk of default on Chengtou bonds has become a difficult task for China’s central and local governments.This work attempts to provide a marginal solution to this task from the perspective of the local government corruption governance method.In particular,using the inspections carried out by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection(CCDI)from 2013 to 2014 as an exogenous shock of local government corruption,this paper analyses whether and how a central government-led anti-corruption campaign may affect the credit risk of Chengtou bonds.The results of the study reveal that CCDI’s regional inspections significantly reduce the credit spread of Chengtou bonds in the secondary market.This phenomenon is more significant in areas with a higher level of corruption,lower administrative levels and lower fiscal transparency,as well as in Chengtou bonds with mortgage or pledge guarantees.These results have important implications:local government corruption is an important determinant of the accumulation of credit risk in Chengtou bonds,while central government-led corruption governance can reduce the credit risk of Chengtou bonds to some extent.