摘要
“避责”作为基层政府官员在履责过程中的异化行为,因其具备较强的策略性、互动性以及影响性,已成为责任政治领域研究的焦点议题。不同于当前学者基于问责推动、利益驱动及心理促动等视角的归因方式,本文从行政压力和制度空间两大因素入手研究基层官员避责行为,并将其归纳为“层级博弈式”避责,探究其层级互动性、利益交叉性以及双向博弈性的特点。“层级博弈式”避责根据行政压力和制度空间的大小变化,主要可以分为向下避责、平级避责、联合避责以及反向避责四种类型。通过对这四种避责类型的案例解析以及建模分析可知,“层级博弈式”避责行为的政治影响具有正负两面性。由此,本文提出应在顶层设计上健全责任分配体制,实现权责对等;在责任落实过程中要灵活施压,实现反向激励;在责任监督上要兼具柔性,实现高效问责,从而提升其积极影响,减少其消极影响,让基层官员的“层级博弈式”避责行为发挥正面作用。
"Responsibility avoidance",as an alienating behavior of grassroots government officials in the process of fulfilling responsibilities,has become a focus of research in the field of responsible politics because of its strong strategic,interactive and influential nature.At present,the responsibility avoidance behavior of my country's grassroots government officials is mainly affected by the dual effects of administrative pressure and system space,and is manifested as a"hierarchical game"type of responsibility avoidance,which has the characteristics of hierarchical interaction,cross-interest and two-way gaming.According to the administrative pressure and changes in the institutional space,the"hierarchical game"behavior of avoiding responsibility can be divided into four types:downward avoidance,equal avoidance,joint avoidance,and reverse avoidance.Through the four types of avoidance types of case analysis and modeling analysis show that the political impact of"hierarchical game"behavior of avoiding responsibility has both pros and cons.Therefore,firstly,we should improve the responsibility distribution system in the top-level design to achieve equal rights and responsibilities;secondly,we must flexibly exert pressure during the implementation of responsibilities to achieve reverse incentives;finally,we must be flexible in responsibility supervision and achieve efficient accountability.Thereby expanding its positive influence and reducing its negative influence,so that the grassroots officials'"hierarchical game"behavior of avoiding responsibility can play a positive role.
作者
彭茜
姚锐敏
Peng Qian;Yao Ruimin(Rural Reform and Development Collaborative Innovation Center/Institute for China Rural Studies,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079)
出处
《甘肃行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第4期48-59,125,共13页
Journal of Gansu Administration Institute
基金
国家社会科学重大基金资助项目“中国共产党建党以来农村基层组织资料收集与数据库建设”(18ZDA128)。
关键词
避责政治
行政压力
制度空间
基层官员
问责制度
Responsibility avoidance politics
Administrative pressure
Institutional space
Grassroots officials
Accountability system