摘要
基于流域跨界水污染问题多关注于上下游矛盾而忽视左右岸的"公地悲剧",本研究构建左、右岸地区和流域政府三方演化博弈模型,探索奖惩、补偿及复合机制下的主体决策和演化格局差异,结合仿真实验给出推动左右岸协同治理政策路径.结果显示,实现左右岸地区达标排放的关键在于显化达标排放收益与超标排放损失.流域政府倾向于选择奖惩或补偿的单一机制,奖惩机制在不同政策组合中显示出必要性,补偿机制具有加快达标决策、减缓超标决策的收敛速度的积极意义.政策路径是首先采取"阶梯惩罚政策"并增加严重超标惩罚额;继而依次增加奖励和惩罚额促成"奖惩机制",或依次增加奖励额和左右岸之间的补偿额促成"补偿机制",同时给出了上述额度的量化表达式.
The contradictions between upstream and downstream have been primarily focused on things other than the"tragedy of the commons"on the left and right banks when referring to the problem of transboundary water pollution in river basins.The tripartite evolutionary game model between the left bank,the right bank,and the government of the river basin was constructed to analyze the strategic choices of all parties and the difference of the evolution pattern under the reward and punishment mechanism,the compensation mechanism and the combined mechanism.Coupled with the simulation experiment,the policy strategy to promote collaborative governance of the left and right banks is presented.It was the key to achieve the standardized discharge on the left and right banks through the explicit gains of the standard discharge and the unequivocal loss of excessive discharge.The government of the river basin favored a single mechanism regarding the reward and punishment mechanism or the compensation mechanism other than the combined mechanism.The reward and punishment mechanism displayed its necessity in different policy combinations.The compensation mechanism was a positive step in catalyzing the convergence rate of standard discharge decisions and reducing the convergence rate of excessive discharge decisions.Firstly,the policy strategy referred to the"stepped penalty policy"that should be implemented,including increasing the fines for severe violations.The rewards and penalties should be subsequently increased in turn to enhance the reward and punishment mechanism,or the reward and the compensation between left and right banks should be increased in turn to promote the compensation mechanism.The quantitative expression of the above quota was concluded as well.
作者
杨志
牛桂敏
兰梓睿
YANG Zhi;NIU Gui-min;LAN Zi-rui(Resources,Environment and Ecology Institute,Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences,Tianjin 300191,China)
出处
《中国环境科学》
EI
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第11期5446-5456,共11页
China Environmental Science
基金
天津市哲学社会科学规划委托项目(TJKSWT1912)
国家社科基金青年项目(20CJY030)
天津社会科学院重点委托课题(21YWT-05)。
关键词
左右岸
界河
跨界水污染
三方演化博弈
数值仿真
left and right banks
boundary rivers
transboundary water pollution
tripartite game
numerical simulation