摘要
受股权纠纷和经营权争夺等因素影响,山水集团发行的债券到期无法按时兑付,导致后续一系列信用风险发生。本文以山水集团风险处置的全过程为研究对象,结果验证了政府引导开展合作博弈的有效性及其作用机制,即企业内部因股权纠纷等非合作博弈会导致内部失序乃至爆发信用风险,政府的适当干预可以引导利益各方有序开展合作博弈,弱化企业内部纷争,进而提高博弈效率,有效处置信用风险。在此基础上,本文提出政府应切实履行防范化解企业风险第一责任人的职责,合理引导、果断介入企业信用风险处置的政策建议。
Due to equity disputes and management rights competition,the bonds issued by Shanshui Group can not be cashed on time,which leads to a series of credit risks.This paper takes the Shanshui Group’s risk event as the research object,and the results verify the effectiveness of government guided cooperative game mechanism.Non cooperative game such as equity dispute will lead to internal disorder and even credit risk outbreak,but appropriate government intervention can guide all stakeholders to carry out cooperative game orderly,which can weaken the internal disputes,improve the efficiency of the game and resolve the credit risks effectively.Finally,this paper puts forward that the government should fulfill the responsibility for resolving enterprise risks,guide scientifically,and intervene enterprise credit risk disposal decisively.
作者
袁征
Yuan Zheng(Business Management Department of PBC Jinan Branch,Jinan 250001,China)
出处
《金融理论探索》
2021年第5期65-72,共8页
Exploration of Financial Theory
关键词
股权纠纷
政府作用
合作博弈
风险处置
equity dispute
government role
cooperative game
risk disposal