能源行业结构转型三方演化博弈分析

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Energy Industry Structural Transformation

构建政府、新能源行业和传统能源行业三方演化博弈模型,分析三方参与主体在能源行业转型过程中策略选择的演化路径及稳定策略,探究能源行业结构转型参与主体的行为策略及影响能源行业结构转型的重要因素。结果表明:存在三方互利的演化稳定策略,单个主体的演化策略会受到其他主体的共同影响,相比传统能源行业新能源行业更受政府参与意愿的影响;政府资金补贴对新能源企业更敏感,补贴过高会降低传统能源企业合作意愿,适当降低积极转型传统能源企业的环境税,利于加快双方合作进程;能源行业整体盈利能力的提高可加快能源行业结构转型。

The tripartite evolutionary game model was constructed by the government,the new energy industry and the traditional energy industry,and the evolution path and stability strategy of the three participants in the process of energy industry transformation were analyzed,and the behavioral strategy of the participants in the energy industry structural transformation and the important factors affecting the energy industry structural transformation were explored.The results show that there is a tripartite mutually beneficial evolutionary stability strategy,the evolutionary strategy of a single player is influenced by other players,and the new energy industry is more likely to be influenced by the willingness of government to participation than the traditional energy industry.Government subsidies are more sensitive to new energy enterprises,and excessive subsidies make traditional energy enterprises less willing to cooperate.Appropriately reduce the environmental tax on enterprises that choose to actively transform traditional energy,which is conducive to accelerating the process of bilateral cooperation.The improvement of the overall profitability of the energy industry can accelerate the structural transformation of the energy industry.