戴震哲学思想的重新审视——以《孟子字义疏证》中“如有物焉”为线索

A Re-examination of Dai Zhen s Philosophy—On the Clue of“Being Like an Object”in Mencius Words and Meanings

戴震对理之“如有物焉”的反对,不只涉及对理本身的理解不同,同时涉及心、性、情一系列问题,相关理解也变得极为不同。根据《孟子字义疏证》所论,戴震主张的“以情絜情”,没有了格物致知,连正心诚意都付之阙如,却让情自带一种天然的“不爽失”。他以“人无有不善”反对程朱之“性无有不善”,坚持的并非性善论,而是人善论。他又反对荀子的礼义在外,将礼义收归人性,看起来是想维护孟子内在化的路线,实则将礼义世界坍陷于人心之中,而人心又陷溺于血气之中。由此,传统儒家丰富的心性工夫论,被戴震一笔勾销,只剩下血气之情欲落到了实处。所谓理一以贯之,也掏空了实质性的内容,仿佛一切都只是为了防范“如有物焉”。

Dai Zhen s opposition to reason“being like an object”not only reflects a different understanding of reason itself,but also involves a different understanding of issues of mind,nature,and emotion.In his Mencius Words and Meanings,Dai Zhen advocates“using emotion to measure emotion”,which does not study the nature of things,or mention sincerity.However,he thinks emotion naturally does not go wrong.He opposes Cheng and Zhu s“nature is not bad”with“no human being is bad”.What he insists on is not the theory of good nature,but the theory of good people.He also opposes Xunzi s external world of rites and righteousness,and puts them back to human nature.He seems to want to maintain Mencius s internalization line,but in fact,he dismantles and drowns the world of rites and righteousness in mind,and in turn drowns mind in flesh and blood.In this way,he deconstructs the traditional Confucian concepts,leaving only the passion of flesh and blood in the whole mind and nature.In his view,the so-called consistent theory with reason hollows out the substantive content,as if everything is just to prevent“being like an object”.