社会救助政策执行中腐败现象的经济学分析

Economic Analysis of Corruption in the Implementation of Social Assistance Policy

我国自20世纪90年代始,逐渐构建了较为完善的社会救助政策体系,但由于在现代化进程中社会治理能力仍较为欠缺,故社会救助政策执行人员挪用救助资金甚至贪污受贿等腐败现象依然存在。基于腐败发生的行为逻辑及过程链条,结合政策执行人员滋生腐败时产生的直接成本、机会成本、社会成本和收益,搭建了“成本—收益”分析框架,进而从提高腐败发生的成本和提升预防腐败的收益两方面,给出了应对社会救助政策执行中腐败现象的治理思路。

Since the 1990s,China has gradually built a relatively perfect system for social assistance policy.However,due to the lack of social governance ability in the process of modernization,there are still corrupt phenomena such as misappropriation of relief funds and even corruption and bribery committed by the executives implementing the social assistance policies.Based on the behavioral logic and process chain of corruption,combined with the direct costs,opportunity costs,social costs and benefits coined by policy executives when they commit corruption,this paper establishes a"cost-benefit"analysis framework,and then gives the management ideas to deal with corruption in the implementation of social assistance policies from two aspects:raising the costs of corruption and improving the benefits of corruption prevention.