论黑格尔的主谓词理论及其“颠倒”问题

On Hegel’s Subjectpredicate Theory and its“Inversion”Problem

费尔巴哈和马克思都指责黑格尔颠倒主词和谓词,但实际情况要复杂得多。黑格尔的逻辑理论是一个庞大的体系,单是在主谓词关系上就有一套以概念的普遍性、特殊性和个体性的关系为核心的,包含四大判断类型的系统理论,不存在逻辑上形式明确的主谓颠倒主张。尽管如此,黑格尔整个哲学的目的在于以概念推演的方式把握绝对(das Absolute),也就是基督教上帝的理性化形态。一方面,“das Absolute”的确切意思是“绝对者”,即具有绝对性的东西,由于它在黑格尔的意义上是独一无二的,因而黑格尔以它作为全部哲学命题的归根到底的主词,把所有的逻辑范畴和实存事物都看成它用来表达自己、说明自己和实现自己的谓词,至少在形式上并没有什么颠倒。另一方面,从内容上看,“绝对”既然是归根到底的主词,也就是最不清楚的概念,所有其他概念都比它清楚,所以才作它的谓词,同时,它又潜在地包含着最大的普遍性,其他概念都是其展开的特殊性,在这个意义上,可以认为它最抽象,其他概念都比它具体,即使“有(Sein)”,由于被黑格尔界定为它的初始谓词,因而在抽象性上也有所不及,仅就此而言,黑格尔犯了主谓颠倒的错误。进一步说,在“绝对”作一切概念的主词的前提下,从“有”开始,黑格尔哲学命题推演的每一步都在从抽象走向具体,由此也可以认为,他一贯以较为抽象的概念作主词,而以较为具体的概念作谓词。总之,对黑格尔主谓颠倒的合理指责大致应该限定在这个范围。

Both Feuerbach and Marx accuse Hegel of inversing the subject and the predicate,but the reality is much more complex.Hegel’s theory of logic is a vast system.In terms of the relationship between the subject and the predicate alone,there is a systematic theory that is centered on the relationship between the universality,particularity and individuality of concepts and that contains four major types of judgement.And there is no assertion featuring the subject-predicate inversion in a logically clear form within Hegel’s system.Nevertheless,the whole philosophy of Hegel aims at grasping das Absolute,the rationalized form of the Christian God,by deducing concepts.On the one hand,"das Absolute"means precisely"the absolute",i.e.,something absolute,and since it is unique in Hegel’s sense,Hegel takes it as the ultimate subject of all philosophical propositions,and regards all logical categories and actual things as predicates which it employs to express,explain and actualize itself.In this regard,there is at least no inversion in the form.On the other hand,with regard to the content,das Absolute is the ultimate subject,that is,the least clear concept,and all other concepts are clearer than it,so they are its predicates.At the same time,it potentially contains the greatest universality,and all other concepts are its unfolding particularity;in this sense it can be considered the most abstract,and all other concepts are more concrete than it.Even"Being(Sein)",defined by Hegel as its initial predicate,is less abstract than it;hence only in this respect Hegel makes the mistake of inversing the subject and the predicate.Further,on the premise that"das Absolute"is the subject of all concepts,Hegel’s deduction of philosophical propositions,starting with"Being",moves from the abstract to the concrete at every step.And it can be argued that he consistently takes the more abstract concepts as subjects and the more concrete concepts as predicates.Therefore,a reasonable accusation of Hegel’s subject-predicate inversion should be generally confined to this.