股权质押影响分析师盈利预测吗? --基于上市公司与分析师互动行为的证据研究

Does Share Pledge Affect Analyst's Earning Forecasts?Evidence from Interactive Behavior between Listed Companies and Analysts

基于上市公司与分析师互动的证据,从与分析师互动的频率和互动分析师的声誉两个维度出发,探索了控股股东股权质押影响分析师盈利预测质量的路径。研究发现:(1)控股股东股权质押降低了分析师盈利预测准确度,提高了盈利预测乐观度和盈利预测分歧度;(2)股权质押通过与分析师互动影响其盈利预测质量;(3)在剥离互动分析师声誉的影响后,股权质押的上市公司通过与分析师频繁地互动直接影响其盈利预测质量;(4)股权质押通过互动分析师声誉模式直接影响其盈利预测质量。异质性检验发现,股权质押控股股东持股比例高、股权质押率高、股权质押到期日临近、上市公司主动性强、基金公司重仓持股将进一步加剧股权质押对分析师盈利预测的影响。

Based on the evidence from interaction between listed companies and analysts, we explore the path that major shareholders’ share pledge affects analysts’ earnings forecasts from the two dimensions of the frequency of interaction and analysts’ reputation. We found that:(1)the share pledge reduces the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and improves the optimism of earnings forecasts and the degree of divergence in earnings forecasts;(2)listed companies with share pledge affect their earnings forecasts through interaction with analysts;(3)peeling off the influence of reputation of interactive analysts, the share pledge directly affects analysts’ earnings forecasts through the frequency of interaction with analysts;(4)the share pledges directly affect their earnings forecasts through the reputation of interactive analysts. Further research found that the higher the shareholding, the higher the share pledge rate, the closer expiration date, the more active the listed company, and the more holdings of fund companies will further aggravate the impact of share pledge on analyst earnings forecasts.