媒体曝光视角下环境污染邻避冲突多方演化博弈分析

Multi-evolutionary game analysis of NIMBY conflicts caused by environmental pollution:From the perspective of media exposure

基于媒体对环境污染事件曝光的不确定性,探讨了邻避冲突中污染企业、周边群众与环境监管部门之间的行为策略选择问题,构建三方演化博弈模型并结合数值仿真,分析了各主体的演化稳定策略与影响策略选择的因素.研究表明,在媒体曝光概率较高的情况下,任何一方主体行为的演化趋势都与其他两方的策略选择密切相关;降低媒体曝光的交易成本、增加对污染企业违规排放的处罚并提高周边群众由于污染受到的补偿,同时上级政府加大对环境监管部门宽松监管时的惩罚力度是有效控制污染邻避冲突的关键.

The behavioral strategies among pollution enterprises,surrounding people and environmental su-pervision departments in NIMBY conflict are discussed considering the uncertainty of media exposure to envi-ronmental pollution events.The evolutionary stability strategies of each participant are analyzed by a tripartite evolutionary game model established and its numerical simulations.The results show that the evolutionary trend of behaviors of any one of the participants is closely related to the strategies of the other two when the probabilty of media exposure is high.Hence,effective measures to reduce the pollution NIMBY conflicts are to reduce the transaction cost of media exposure,to raise the violation penalties for polluting enterprises and to increase compensation for surrounding people due to environmental pollution.At the same time,it is also of significant importance for governments to increase punishment for the environmental supervision departments’negligence of supervision.