中国农村合作金融组织内生机理的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Endogenous Mechanism of Rural Cooperative Financial Organizations in China

农村资金互助合作社作为农村合作金融新的组织形式在农村存在已久,它在快速发展的同时也面临着因为"跑路"风险而激增的质疑。本文构建了亲缘选择和直接互惠机制下的演化博弈模型,研究了农村合作金融产生的内生机理,试图为农村合作金融未来发展政策制定提供思路。研究发现:亲缘关系强度对农户合作意愿有促进作用,有效解决了合作困境。在直接互惠机制影响下,农户交互频率即重复博弈次数越多,越有利于促进农户之间资金互助合作行为涌现。因此,可以充分利用农村圈层结构稳定和特殊的亲缘关系,变"他组织"为"自组织",推动合作金融内生发展。

As a new organizational form of rural cooperative finance,rural mutual fund cooperatives have existed in rural areas for a long time.While it is developing rapidly,it is also faced with the doubt that it proliferates due to the risk of“running away”.This paper constructed evolutionary game model under kin selection and direct reciprocity to study the endogenous mechanism of rural cooperative finance and try to provide ideas for the policy formulation of rural cooperative finance in the future.The study shows that the intensity of kinship relationship promotes the willingness of farmers to cooperate,solved the cooperation dilemma effectively.Under the influence of direct reciprocity mechanism,the more interaction frequency of farmers,the more times of repeated game,the more conducive to the emergence of mutual financial cooperation among farmers.Therefore,we can make full use of the stable structure and special kinship of rural circle layer to change“other organization”into“self-organization”,and promote the endogenous development of cooperative finance.