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大国竞争中的军备控制与全球战略稳定--以美苏核军控谈判为例 被引量:4

Arms Control and Global Strategic Stability in Great Power Competition:An Analysis Based on the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations
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摘要 为更好应对与日俱增的全球战略稳定风险和考验,我们应当认真总结和借鉴冷战时期美国和苏联在核武器领域军备控制的实践和经验。美苏军控谈判呈现出三个特点:双方习惯于先达成讨论事项的整体框架,然后再谈判具体细节;双方都试图通过军控限制对手的能力并保存自己的实力;美国行政部门内部以及行政部门和国会之间的博弈对军备控制协议有重大影响。从美苏军控的实践中可以总结出三条经验:核军备控制是美苏共同利益;军备控制与军备建设都是实现国家利益的手段;透明与核查是建立信心的重要途径。中国缺乏军备控制的经验,但更大程度参与军备控制的压力日益增加。为此,中国可通过提高军事透明度、参与各层级战略对话、主动设计军控框架方案等手段提升应对军控谈判的能力,同时也要坚持中国核战略传统不动摇。 To better address the growing risks to global strategic stability,we should learn from the practices and lessons of the United States and the Soviet Union in nuclear arms control during the Cold War.The U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations had three distinctive features.First,the two sides often agreed on a general framework before negotiating specific details.Second,both sides tried to limit the capabilities of their opponents and preserve their own strengths through arms control.Third,the debate within the U.S.executive branches and between the executive branch and Congress had a significant impact on arms control agreements.Three lessons can be drawn from U.S.-Soviet arms control practices.Firstly,nuclear arms control is a common U.S.-Soviet interest.Secondly,arms control and arms building are both means to achieve their national interests.Thirdly,transparency and verification are important ways to build confidence.Despite China lacks arms control experience,there is growing pressure for China to become more involved in arms control.China can improve its ability to respond to arms control negotiations by increasing military transparency, participating in strategic dialogues at all levels,and proactively designing arms control framework,while maintaining China’s nuclear strategy tradition.
作者 吴日强 WU Riqiang
出处 《外交评论(外交学院学报)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第6期45-66,I0002,I0003,共24页 Foreign Affairs Review
关键词 军备控制 美苏核军控谈判 全球战略稳定 中美关系 冷战 arms control U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations global strategic stability China-U.S.relations national interests Cold War
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