信息不对称下的双渠道结构

Dual Channel with Information Asymmetry

本文研究了在由一个制造商和多个零售商组成的供应链中,当市场需求不确定;制造商和零售商各自拥有关于不确定需求的私有信息(即信息不对称);多个零售商之间存在古诺竞争的情形下,制造商是否应该开设直销渠道,以及零售商在双渠道结构下是否有动机与制造商共享信息。我们利用多期博弈模型来描述制造商和零售商的行为并最终得到显示解。通过对均衡解的分析发现,在本文设定的模型下,如果直销边际成本较小,则开设直销渠道对制造商有益,而且制造商掌握的市场需求信息越多,它就越倾向于开设直销渠道。进一步的,在双渠道结构下零售商不愿意与制造商分享私人信息。此外,若制造商的边际直销成本为零,则在开设直销渠道的情况下,参与垂直方向信息共享的零售商的均衡利润为零,零售商将退出为该制造商销售产品。

This paper examines a supply chain that includes a single manufacturer and multiple retailers.Themanufacturer and the retailers have private information on random market demand.In addition,there exists Cournotcompctition among the distribution channels.In this setting,we investigate the following questions.First,when shouldthe manufacturer operate a direct channel in the uncertain environment?Second,.if the manufacturer opens a direct store,do the retailers have an incentive to share their own information with the manufacturer?To answer these questions,weuse Stackelberg game to model the interaction between the manufacturer and the retailers.We find that,when variableoperating cost of the direct channel is below a threshold value,the manufacturer is better off engaging in direct sales.Especially,when the manufacturer obtains more information about market demand,it will be more inclined to add thedirect channel.lf the manufacturer opens a direct channel,the retailers are still reluctant to share information.Inaddition,when the marginal cost of the direct channel is zero,profits of the retailers who share their infornation with themanufacturer will drop to zero with the presence of a direct channel.