污染减排的晋升激励效应:基于省级党政领导的检验

Promotion Incentive Effect of Pollution Reduction:Evidence from Provincial Party Secretaries and Governors

【目的/意义】检验地方环境治理绩效对省级党政领导政治晋升的影响,以期窥探环境保护绩效考核制度的激励效应,为进一步优化地方环境治理和干部管理制度提供经验证据和政策建议。【设计/方法】考虑多维度的治理绩效,包括经济发展、环境保护、社会治安和民生保障等,构建官员晋升的多重影响因素模型,并以1997-2017年发生职务变动的省级党政领导为样本进行回归检验。【结论/发现】任期内二氧化硫(SO_(2))和工业化学需氧量(COD)的减排对省级党政领导的晋升均存在显著的正向影响,尤其是在2007年之后,SO_(2)减排的影响大于工业COD减排的影响。地方GDP增长率对官员的晋升几率始终呈现显著的正向影响,但这种影响在2007年以后大幅减弱,并且开始小于SO_(2)减排的影响。因此,以GDP为导向的地方官员考核机制已经发生显著转变。

[Purpose/Significance]Through examining the impact of local environmental governance on the political promotion of the provincial party secretaries and governors,it is expected to explore the incentive effect of the environmental performance appraisal system,and provide empirical evidence and policy suggestions for further optimizing local environmental governance and cadre management system.[Design/Methodology]Considering the multi-dimensional governance performance,including economic development,environmental protection,social security and people's livelihood,this paper constructs the regression model for the officials'promotion,and takes the provincial party secretaries and governors who changed their positions from 1997 to 2017 as samples.[Findings/Conclusions]Both the reduction of SO_(2)and industrial COD have a positive impact on the promotion odds of provincial officials,especially after 2007,but the impact of SO_(2) reduction is much larger than that of industrial COD reduction.Local GDP growth has a significant and steady positive impact on the political promotion of officials.However,after 2007,the impact of local GDP growth has weakened significantly and begun to be smaller than the impact of SO_(2) reduction.Therefore,the GDP-based performance management system for local officials has been undergoing significant reform.