基于斯塔伯格博弈的多利益主体需求响应策略

Multi-stakeholder demand response strategy based on Stackelberg game

随着泛在电力物联网加速建设,聚合用户侧可控负荷提高电网的可调控容量,提高电网的可靠性与经济性变得越来越重要。文中挖掘用户侧可控负荷类型,聚焦需求侧响应策略,从系统运营者角度构建了实时平衡市场中大工业用户、负荷集中商、终端用户参与需求响应以及发电商上调出力的数学模型,建立系统运营者的最小调整成本目标函数。在此基础上,提出需求响应的斯塔伯格博弈数学模型,模型中系统运营者作为领导者,需求响应市场主体作为追随者,系统运营者对各追随者提供激励,各市场主体根据激励相容原则进行决策,决策出最佳需求响应电量,此时为系统最小调节成本。基于某地区多类负荷参与需求响应的算例,运用粒子群分散式决策算法,考虑需求响应的电量边界约束,设定负荷优先级,求解需求响应策略。算例仿真结果验证了所建模型与方法的可行性与有效性。

With the accelerated construction of the ubiquitous power Internet of things, there is an emerging understanding of the significance of aggregating the controllable load on the user side to improve the controllable capacity of the power grid and enhance the reliability of the power grid. This paper explores the type of user-side controllable load and focuses on demand-side response strategy. Firstly, from the perspective of system operators, a mathematical model is constructed to balance the real-time demand response of large industrial users, load concentrators, end-users participating in demand response and up-regulated output of power generation operators, meanwhile, the objective function of the minimum adjustment cost of system operators is established. on this basis, the demand response of Stackelberg is put forward, the system operators as a leader, demand response to the market is as followers, system operators provides incentives to the followers, the market participant to make decisions based on incentive compatibility principle, it is the minimum adjustment cost of system. Finally, based on a real example, the decentralized decision-making algorithm of particle swarm optimization was applied to consider the power boundary constraint of demand response, set load priority, and solves the demand response strategy. The simulation results of the example verified the feasibility and effectiveness of the established model and method.