超额商誉与商业信用融资

Excess Goodwill and Trade Credit Financing

利用我国2007-2020年A股上市公司作为研究样本,从供应商和客户的角度出发考察超额商誉对商业信用融资的影响,研究发现超额商誉会抑制企业的商业信用融资。中介机制检验发现超额商誉会使企业经营风险上升、会计稳健性下降,导致供应商和客户提供商业信用的意愿降低。拓展性分析还发现当企业处于市场竞争比较激烈的行业、市场化水平比较低的地区时,超额商誉对商业信用融资的负面影响更加显著。研究表明供应商和客户会将超额商誉视为企业高风险的信号,拓展了超额商誉负面经济后果的相关文献,对于监管部门和企业制定相关决策也具有一定的参考价值。

This paper uses China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as a research sample to investigate the impact of excess goodwill on trade credit financing from the perspective of suppliers and customers.It is found that excess goodwill will inhibit trade credit financing.The mechanism test found that excess goodwill will increase the enterprise’s operating risk and reduce the accounting conservatism,resulting in the decrease of suppliers and customers’willingness to provide trade credit.It is also found that when enterprises are in industries with fierce market competition and regions with low marketization level,the negative impact of excess goodwill on trade credit financing is more significant.This paper shows that suppliers and customers will regard excess goodwill as a signal of high risk,which not only expands the relevant literature on the negative economic consequences of excess goodwill,but also has a certain reference value for regulators and enterprises to make relevant decisions.