黑客随机攻击下的企业信息系统安全投资策略

Enterprise Information System Security Investment Strategies in Consideration of Opportunistic Attacks Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

在企业信息系统安全投资策略研究中,黑客攻击方式是企业投资决策需要考虑的重要因素。本文采用演化博弈理论,通过构建企业群体与黑客群体的动态博弈模型,对黑客随机攻击情形下企业与黑客的演化稳定策略进行了求解,并分析了黑客攻击概率、企业网络对外联接度和安全投资效率等因素对演化稳定策略的影响。研究表明:在黑客随机攻击情形下,为改变对企业不利的稳定策略,企业成本过高时,可以在估计黑客攻击概率的基础上,通过调整网络对外联接度、潜在损失和安全投资效率的关系来达到降低投资成本和提高企业信息系统安全水平的目的。

In the research of enterprise information system security investment strategy,the type of hacker attacks is an important factor to consider in enterprise investment decision.This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to construct a dynamic game model between enterprise group and hacker group to solve the evolutionary stability strategies of enterprises and hackers under opportunistic attack and analyze the impact of factors such as the hacker attack probability,enterprise network exposure degree and security investment efficiency on evolutionary stability strategies.It is found that,to change the adverse stability strategy for enterprises,when the enterprise cost is too high,it's better for enterprises to adjust the relation of network exposure degree,potential losses and security investment efficiency to reduce investment costs and improve the level of enterprise information system security based on estimating attack probability in the case of opportunistic attacks.