演化博弈视角下海外耕地投资参与主体合作行为策略

Cooperative behavioral strategies of overseas farmland investment participants from the perspective of evolutionary game

由于信息不对称、风险管理缺位,导致中国企业海外耕地投资项目失败的案例持续出现,损害了参与主体各方的利益。"走出去"企业如何通过耕地投资项目实现与东道国长期合作已经成为中国推动海外农业资源保障国家粮食安全面临的关键问题。基于不同参与主体在海外耕地投资过程中的有限理性行为,构建中国企业、东道国政府和东道国土地所有者三方演化博弈模型,并以西安爱菊粮油工业集团为例进行数值分析。结果表明:(1)中国企业、东道国政府、东道国土地所有者三方演化博弈模型存在4个演化稳定点可达到稳定状态,分别对应三方主体不同的策略选择;(2)中国企业在进行"独立经营"或"合作经营"的策略选择时,往往对东道国政府和东道国土地所有者策略选择的反应更为迅速,演化路径更为敏感,而东道国政府实现均衡状态所需的时间最为漫长,演化路径最为平稳,策略选择受到中国企业与东道国土地所有者的影响较小;(3)东道国政府的"损失厌恶"心理往往使其在制定有利于中国企业政策的"高支持"策略时犹豫而缓慢,在制定不利于中国企业策略的"低支持"策略时坚定且迅速,这对于中国企业海外耕地投资的稳定性与长期性提出了较高的要求;(4)中国企业在海外耕地投资过程中离不开东道国政府的支持,当中国企业选择"独立经营"策略时,受东道国政府"高支持"策略的影响较小,而选择"合作经营"策略时,受东道国政府"高支持"策略的影响较大,此时需要考虑东道国政府策略选择的倾向性与可能性。最后,为中国企业营造稳定的海外耕地投资环境提出建议。

Due to asymmetric information and lack of risk management,cases of failure of Chinese companies’overseas farmland investment projects continue to occur,damaging the interests of all parties involved.Achieving long-term cooperation of the“going global”companies with the host countries through farmland investment projects has become a key issue for promoting national food security using overseas agricultural resources.Based on the limited rational behavior of different participants in the overseas farmland investment process,a tripartite evolutionary game model of Chinese companies,host country governments,and host country landowners was constructed,and a numerical analysis was conducted with Xi’an Aiju Cereals and Oils Industry Group as an example.The results show that:(1)The tripartite evolutionary game model of Chinese companies,host country governments,and host country landowners has four evolutionary stability points that can reach a stable state,corresponding to the different strategic choices of the three parties.(2)When Chinese companies make strategic choices of independent operation or cooperative operation,they often respond more quickly to the host country government and host country landowner strategic choices and the evolution path is more sensitive.Host country governments take the longest time to achieve equilibrium,the evolution path is the most stable,and the strategic choice is less influenced by Chinese companies and host country landowners.(3)The loss aversion psychology of the host country governments often makes them hesitant and slow when formulating a“high support”strategy that is favorable to Chinese corporate policies and is firm and quick when formulating a“low support”strategy that is not favorable to Chinese corporate policies.This situation poses high requirements for the stability and long-term engagement of Chinese companies’overseas investment in farmland.(4)In the process of overseas farmland investment,Chinese companies cannot do without the support of the host country governments.When Chinese companies choose the independent management strategy,they are less affected by the host country governments’“high support”strategy,but when they choose the cooperative management strategy,they are more affected by the host country governments’“high support”strategy.The tendency and possibility of the host country governments’strategic choice should be considered in such case.