政府补贴、机构股东与成本粘性

Government Subsidies,Institutional Shareholders and Cost Stickiness of Enterprises

以2013—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用拓展的成本粘性模型,探究“八项规定”后政府补贴、机构股东对企业成本粘性的影响,以及机构股东的调节作用,研究发现:政府补贴增强了成本粘性,机构股东能抑制成本粘性,机构股东对政府补贴与成本粘性之间的关系起负向调节作用。进一步研究发现,政府补贴对成本粘性的影响与企业产权性质无关;机构股东对成本粘性的影响以及机构股东的调节作用仅在非国有企业中存在。不同地区,政府补贴、机构股东、成本粘性之间关系不同。政府补贴对成本粘性的影响仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份时存在;机构股东对成本粘性的影响与地方政府官员变更无关,但机构股东的调节作用仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份存在。

Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2017 as samples,and using extended cost stickiness model,this article explores the influence of local governments and institutional shareholders on cost stickiness of enterprises after the“Eight Regulations”,as well as the regulatory role of institutional shareholders.The study found that government subsidies would enhance cost stickiness,institutional shareholders can inhibit cost stickiness,and institutional shareholders play a negative role in regulating the relationship between government subsidies and cost stickiness.Further research found that the impact of government subsidies on cost stickiness has nothing to do with the nature of corporate property rights;The influence of institutional shareholders on cost stickiness and the regulatory role of institutional shareholders only exist in non-state-owned enterprises.Different regions have different relationships concerning government subsidies,institutional shareholders,and cost stickiness.The impact of government subsidies on cost stickiness only exists in the years when local officials have not changed.