监管套利、货币政策与我国影子银行的发展--基于我国商业银行微观数据的研究

Regulatory Arbitrage,Monetary Policy and the Development of Shadow Banking in China--Based on the Research of Micro Data of Commercial Banks in China

本文分析了我国影子银行的发展成因,并实证研究了2007-2017年我国商业银行开展影子银行业务的影响因素。研究发现,银行的贷款能力越弱(存贷比指标距离监管红线越近),其影子银行业务占比越大,说明商业银行为规避正规金融体系的监管而进行的监管套利行为是激励其开展影子银行业务的重要因素。此外,在紧缩性货币政策环境下,商业银行的影子银行业务占比越高。

This paper first builds a theoretical model and analyzes the contributing factors of China’s shadow banking system,then conducts an empirical study on the driving forces behind shadow banking business of China’s commercial banks based on the data of redemptory monetary capital for sale and investment in receivables during the period from 2007 to 2017.The study shows that the more credit constraints the banks face(proxied by the loan to deposit ratio,LDR constraint),the more they expand shadow banking business.This evidence illustrates that the regulatory arbitrage resulting from the regulatory limits of the formal banking system is the main driving force behind shadow banking business.In addition,monetary tightening leads to an increase in shadow bank lending.Finally,we provide some policy recommendations,including enhancing the regulation on the shadow banking system,reducing regulatory costs,improving regulatory effi ciency and strengthening the joint force of monetary policies and regulatory policies.