政府与国有企业间的利润分配对企业超额雇员的影响

The Impact of Profit Distribution Between Government and SOEs on Excess Employees

本文建立理论模型分析了政府与国有企业间的利润分配影响企业超额雇员的作用机理,并以2003-2016年中国沪深A股央企上市公司为样本,通过考察中国2007年开始实施的央企利润上缴政策对央企上市公司超额雇员的影响,对理论假说进行了计量检验。研究发现,提高央企利润上缴比例,降低了央企上市公司的超额雇员,并且该效应在盈利能力较强、政府控股比例较低和市场化程度较高地区的公司样本中更加显著。进一步分析发现,随着央企利润上缴比例的提高和超额雇员的减少,央企上市公司具有更高的人均销售收入水平和全要素生产率。本研究对于如何加快剥离国有企业的政策性负担具有重要的启示意义。

This paper establishes a theoretical model to analyse the impact mechanism of the government and SOEs’profit distribution system on excess employees.Taking data from Chinese A-share listed central SOEs from between 2003 and 2016 as a sample,the theoretical hypothesis is empirically tested by examining the impact of China’s central SOE profit handover policy on the excess employees of listed central SOEs.The results of the study show that an increase in the proportion of profit handover from central SOEs reduces the excess employees in listed central SOEs.This effect is even more significant in a sample of companies with higher profitability,lower government shareholding ratio and located in regions with higher degree of marketisation.Further analysis indicates that with the increase in the proportion of profits turned over by central SOEs,listed central SOEs have a higher per capital sales revenue growth rate and total factor productivity.This research has important implications for how to accelerate the removal of the policy burden from SOEs.