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基于服务商投机博弈的政府购买公共服务优化治理

Optimal Governance of Government Purchase of Public Services Based on Service Providers’Speculative Game
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摘要 在公共服务采买项目中,一些服务商会利用信息的不对称以及契约的不完全性,通过各种技术手段寻求投机行为,以谋求自身利益最大化,使购买公共服务者增加成本,给财政添加负担,形成不良影响。针对服务商在公共服务供给中的投机行为,从政府监管视角出发,构建服务商与政府监管机构间的演化博弈模型,运用博弈理论和Vensim仿真工具分析四种情形下的演化稳定策略和参数变化对演化稳定结果的影响。结果显示:服务商努力供给获得的补贴额和采取投机行为付出的成本、政府监管机构的监管投入和监管收益是影响服务商与政府监管机构策略选择的主要因素;惩罚作用存在一定的条件限制,也存在失效的可能。因此,要充分依靠补贴或奖励的正向激励作用,提高违规努力成本,降低监管投入成本来构建监管保障机制;政府应将公共服务项目运营监管纳入工作考核之中,在制定监管策略时要明确在政府监管的条件下惩罚才会起到威慑效果,若政府监管机构存在失职行为,也应对其予以重罚。 In public service procurement projects,some service chambers of Commerce take advantage of information asymmetry and contract incompleteness to seek speculation through various technical means,so as to maximize their own interests,increase costs to units,add financial burden and have a negative impact on the society.Aiming at the speculation of service providers in the supply of public services,from the perspective of government regulation,the author constructs an evolutionary game model between service providers and government regulators,and uses Game theory and Vensim simulation tool to analyze the impact of evolutionary stability strategies and parameter changes on evolutionary stability results in four cases.The results show that:the amount of subsidies obtained by service providers and the cost of speculation,and the regulatory investment and regulatory income of government regulators are the main factors affecting the strategic choice between service providers and government regulators;and there are some restrictions on the punishment effect,and there is also the possibility of failure.Therefore,two suggestions are put forward.First,we should fully rely on the positive incentive effect of subsidies or rewards,increase the cost of illegal efforts and reduce the cost of supervision investment to build a supervision guarantee mechanism.And second,the government should incorporate the operation supervision of public service projects into the work assessment;when formulating the supervision strategy,it should be clear that,under the condition of government supervision,the role of punishment will play a deterrent effect;the supervision of government regulators should also be put on the agenda;and if the government regulators have dereliction of duty,they should be severely punished.
作者 倪东生 NI Dong-sheng(Business school,Beijing Wuzi University,Beijing 101149,China)
出处 《中国流通经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第12期102-111,共10页 China Business and Market
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“涉公服务采买过程隐性风险的识别与治理研究”(16BGL188)。
关键词 公共服务 政府监管 博弈 投机 惩罚 public services government supervision Game speculation punishment
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