卖空机制与企业高管责任保险购买决策--基于双重差分的实证研究

Short Selling Mechanism and the Purchasing Decisions of Directors'and Officers'Liability Insurance--Empirical Research based on Difference in Differences

卖空机制是影响企业经营行为的重要市场机制。高管责任保险作为保障高管权益的关键战略,会受到外部市场环境的影响。本文以2008—2017年我国A股上市公司为研究对象,使用双重差分法考察了影响高管责任保险购买的因素。实证结果表明,卖空机制增加了企业购买高管责任保险的概率。上述研究结论经过内生性和稳定性测试后依旧稳健。进一步的研究发现,卖空机制通过提高企业内控质量、提升高管薪酬待遇,进而增加了企业购买高管责任保险的意愿。综上,本文为识别卖空机制对企业购买高管责任保险的影响提供了部分实证证据,并探讨了卖空机制对企业购买高管责任保险可能的影响渠道。研究结论为高管责任保险购买决策提供了经验证据。

Short selling is an important market mechanism that affects business operations.As a key strategy for protecting executives,executive liability insurance(or D&O insurance)will be affected by the external market environment.This paper uses 2008-2017 Chinese listed companies as the research objects the Difference in Differences method to examine the factors that affect the purchase of executive liability insurance.The empirical results show that short selling helps to increase the probability of companies purchasing D&O insurance.The above research conclusions are still robust after endogeneity and stability tests.Through further discovery,short selling improves the willingness of corporate executives to purchase liability insurance by improving the quality of corporate internal controls and enhancing executives'compensations.To sum up,this paper provides some empirical evidence to identify the impact of short-selling on executive liability insurance,and explores the possible influence channels of short-selling on executive liability insurance.The research conclusion has certain reference value for enterprise risk managements.