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论自我知识的构成主义观点 被引量:1

A Constitutivist Theory of Self-Knowledge
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摘要 构成主义观点致力于在自然主义的心灵图景中解释自我知识的特殊性与第一人称权威。为此,它主张高阶信念和一阶态度不是相互独立的,而是有着构成性的关系。概念论解释试图从认识主体的概念能力,特别是批判性推理的能力来作出论证。默认权威观点则诉诸日常话语实践的"语法"要求,主张认识主体对自我的态度拥有先天合理的、又可由证据挫败的确信。通过引入"以言行事"的思路,构成主义有希望确立起合理、审慎、有节制的第一人称权威观点。 The constitutivist view is devoted to explaining the particularity of self-knowledge and first-person authority in virtue of naturalism.To this end,it holds that higher-order beliefs and first-order attitudes are not independent of each other,but are involved in constitutive relationships.Conceptualists would attempt to demonstrate those relationships from employing some of conceptual capacities,especially the ability of critical reasoning.The default authoritative point of view resorts to the"grammar"requirement of daily discourse practice,and advocates that the subject’s attitude towards himself is innately reasonable and can be thwarted by evidence.In terms of the notion of illocutionary act,constitutivism is promising to establish a reasonable,prudential,and moderate conception of first-person authority.
作者 徐竹 XU Zhu
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第11期30-38,48,共10页 Academic Monthly
基金 上海市社科规划一般项目(2019BZX006)“知行关系视域下的当代西方自我知识理论研究”的阶段性成果。
关键词 自我知识 构成主义 第一人称权威 默认权威观点 self-knowledge constitutivism first person authority default authority view
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