考虑产品绿色度的双渠道供应链博弈分析与协调

Game Analysis and Coordination of Double-Channel Products Supply Chain Considering Product Green Degree

研究一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,考虑产品绿色度、渠道销量敏感系数、网络渠道物流配送水平等因素,建立分散决策和集中决策下的供应链博弈模型.对两模型中的绿色度、价格、渠道销量、成员利润等变量进行分析,建立二阶段协调契约促进成员合作.通过算例分析验证不同因素对模型求解结果的影响.研究发现:双渠道市场份额必须满足一定的条件,制造商和零售商才愿意参与到双渠道供应链中.集中决策下,各变量不受渠道市场份额的影响,渠道销量敏感系数对各变量的影响较分散决策更为明显.随着零售商投入销售成本增加,制造商利润增加,但零售商利润随制造商投入配送成本的增加而降低.

This paper studies a dual channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer.Considering the factors such as product green degree,channel sales sensitivity coefficient,network channel logistics and distribution level,two supply chain game models under decentralized and centralized decision-making are established.The green degree,price,channel sales,member profit and other variables in the two models are analyzed,then a two-stage coordination contract is established to promote member’s cooperation.The influence of different factors on the results of model solution is analyzed.Numerical experiments are tested,which suggests that the market share of the two channels must meet certain conditions,then manufacturer and retailer are willing to participate in the dual-channel supply chain.Under the centralized decision,each variable is not affected by the channel market share.However,under the centralized decision,the influence of the channel sales sensitivity coefficient on each variable is more obvious than that of the decentralized decision.With the increase of the retailer’s marketing cost,the manufacturer’s profit increases,but the retailer’s profit decreases with the increasing of manufacturer’s logistics costs.