政府奖惩下回收商主导的闭环供应链决策研究

Research on the Recycler-led Closed-loop Supply Chain Decisions under Reward-penalty Mechanism

在由单主导回收商和两竞争制造商构成的闭环供应链中,回收商的固定回收成本为非对称信息。基于委托—代理、博弈理论,构建了无奖惩、碳排放奖惩以及碳排放与回收奖惩下的动态博弈模型,分析了奖惩机制、制造商竞争对系统决策及成员收益的影响。结果表明:系统决策受碳排放奖惩与回收率奖惩的交互影响,回收率奖惩有利于有效引导WEEE回收和再制造;参与WEEE再制造的制造商1始终在价格、利润方面具有竞争优势,高固定成本的回收商始终具有规模优势;竞争能促进WEEE回收,也有利于提高成员收益。

In the recycler-led closed-loop supply chain including a single recycler and two competing manufactures,it's assumed that the fixed recycling cost of the recycler is asymmetric information.Three dynamic game models are built based on the dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory,the we discusses the influence on system decisions and members benefits of reward-penalty mechanism and competition.The key research findings are summarized as follows:The decisions of CLSC are affected by the interaction of carbon emission and recovery rate reward-penalty mechanism,the recovery rate reward-penalty mechanism can guide WEEE recycling through increasing the recycler's and manufacture-one's profit.In any case,the manufacturer 1 involved in WEEE remanufacturing always has competitive advantages in terms of retail price and profit.Similarly,the recycler with high fixed costs always has scale advantages.It's strongly proved that the competition can fully mobilize the system members to recycle WEEE.