国企党组织“双向进入”的治理效应——基于审计师选择的视角

The Governance Role of“Two-way Access”of Party Organizations in State-owned Enterprises——Based on the Selection of Auditors

国有企业党组织建设是新时代党建工作的重要内容。基于手工收集整理的国有企业党组织参与公司治理的数据,分析了国有企业党组织双向进入模式对审计师选择的影响。党组织双向进入模式使党委委员更多地担任公司的董事、监事和高级管理人员,他们不仅受公司章程和制度的制约,还受到党内纪律的约束,同时受到更广泛的监督,使得公司治理效应得到提高,降低了对高质量审计的需求。进一步分析表明,党组织双向进入对高质量审计师的需求较低,主要是因为党组织双向进入提高了高管薪酬契约的有效性、提高了会计信息质量、提高了资源使用效率,表现出更强的治理效应。

The construction of party organizations in state-owned enterprises is an important part of party building work in the new era.Based on the manually collected data of state-owned enterprise party organizations participating in corporate governance this paper analyzes the influence of“two-way access”mode of state-owned enterprise party organizations on auditor selection.The"two-way access"mode of the party organization makes the party Committee members serve as more directors supervisors and senior managers of the company.They are not only restricted by the company's articles of association and system but also restricted by the inner-party discipline and at the same time they are subject to wider supervision which improves the corporate governance and reduces the demand for high-quality audit.Further analysis shows that the party organization's"two-way access"has low demand for high-quality auditors mainly because the party organization's"two-way access"has improved the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts improved the quality of accounting information improved the efficiency of resource use and showed stronger governance effects.