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政府不同补贴策略对单/双渠道回收影响研究 被引量:13

Study on the Impact of Different Government Subsidy Strategies on Single/Double Recycling Channels
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摘要 技术快速发展,产品生命周期越来越短,更新换代加快,使废旧产品回收成为社会和企业关注焦点。为促进废旧产品回收再利用,政府采取补贴策略,政府可以通过两种补贴策略来参与废旧产品回收,一种策略是补贴给回收商,一种策略是补贴给处理商。而在废旧产品回收过程中,存在两种常见模式,一种是单渠道回收,一种是双渠道回收。为分析政府不同补贴策略对两种回收模式影响以及确立最优的补贴模式,本文采用博弈论基于两种回收模式构建政府不同补贴策略下回收商和处理商博弈模型,基于此模型,对比分析政府补贴对回收渠道决策变量、回收数量和收益影响,确立最优回收模式边界条件。研究主要得到:在单渠道回收时,政府补贴对象不同不影响废旧产品回收数量;在双渠道回收时,政府补贴给处理商最优;无论是单渠道还是双渠道回收模式,当政府补贴给回收商时,处理商都会采取降低废旧产品单位委托回收价格来转移政府补贴;当政府补贴额度大于某一阀值时,单渠道回收模式比双渠道回收模式回收效果优,反之,采取双渠道回收最优。 The rapid development of technology makes the product life cycle shorter and shorter, and replacement more accelerate. Thus, the recycling of waste products has become the focus of society and enterprises. The government adopts the subsidy strategy in order to promote the recycling of waste products, and it could participate in the recycling of waste products through two subsidy strategies, one is to subsidize recyclers, and the other is to subsidize processors. In the recycling process of waste products, there are two common modes, one is single-channel recycling, and the other is dual-channel recycling. In order to analyze the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the two recycling models and establish the optimal subsidy model, the single/double channel recycling game model isconstructed. Basing the game model, the influence of government subsidies on the recycling channel decision variables, recycling quantity and income is comparably analyzed, and the optimal recycling mode boundary conditions is established. The main research results are as follows: the different subsidy targets of government does not affect the amount of waste product recycling when it is the single channel recycling;government giving subsidies to the processors is optimal when it is the dual channel recycling;whether it is single-channel or dual-channel recycling, the processors could get government subsidy through reduce the unit price of waste product entrusted;when the government subsidy amount is greater than a certain threshold, the single-channel recycling mode is better than the dual-channel recycling mode, conversely, the dual-channel recycling is optimal.
作者 夏西强 朱庆华 XIA Xi-qiang;ZHU Qing-hua(Business School,Zhengzhou University,Zhengzhou 450001,China;Antai College of Economics&Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2021年第11期88-98,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71702174) 国家自然基金重点资助项目(71632007) 国家自然科学基金重大资助项目(71690241) 教育部人文社科规划项目(21YJC630140) 河南省科技创新人才支持计划(21-CX-007)。
关键词 政府补贴 单渠道回收 双渠道回收 博弈论 government subsidy single channel recycling dual channel recycling game theory
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