胡塞尔现象学:一种大写理性的经验态度——对《基于现象学方法的服务设计定义探究》的质疑

Husserl’s Phenomenology as a Raison Attitude About Experience——Query on the Thesis“Inquiry into the Definition of Service Design Based on Phenomenological Methods”

代福平、辛向阳在《基于现象学方法的服务设计定义探究》中宣称利用现象学方法获得的“服务”新定义违反了定义的规则,应该被视为不准确的定义。该文认为利用“本质直观”的方法必然能够获取关于事物的正确性知识,这是将思维活动中由逻辑法则规范的正确性误解为是由逻辑法则引发的正确性,曲解了胡塞尔现象学和“本质直观”方法的基本意图。在本质直观思维进路的具体描述中:该文以多个对象为基础展开“直观”,与以个体对象为出发点的本质直观原则不一致;分步骤、有选择的“悬置”操作,与对整个自然态度悬而不论、使其失去效用的现象学悬置操作相悖;从悬置前见到直观事物本质之间亦缺乏操作的充分性和系统性。此外,作为主张以第一人称视角进行描述的现象学,该文对桑普森(第三人称)思维进路的现象学描述显然是不合适的。作为“严格的科学”的胡塞尔现象学,在面向事实科学的问题中,体现出一种能够涵容非理性的经验的“大写理性”态度。

In the thesis“Inquiry into the Definition of Service Design Based on Phenomenological Methods”,Dai Fuping and Xin Xiangyang declared that the new definition of“service”by using phenomenological methods violates the rules of definition and ought to be regarded as an inaccurate definition.This paper holds that the method of“essential intuition”must be able to obtain the correct knowledge about things,which misunderstands the correctness regulated by logical rules in thinking activities as the correctness caused by logical rules,and misinterprets the basic intention of Husserl’s phenomenology and“essential intuition”method.In the specific description of the thinking approach of essential intuition:the thesis develops the“intuitive concept”based on the multiple objects,which is inconsistent with the principle of essential intuition based on the individual objects;the step-by-step,selective“Epoché”operation is incompatible with the phenomenological Epochéoperation that ignores the whole natural attitude and makes it ineffective.There is also a lack of sufficiency and systematization of operation between seeing the nature of intuitive objects and Epoché.Furthermore,as a phenomenology that advocates describing from the first-person perspective,it is obviously inappropriate about the phenomenological description of Sampson’s(from the third-person perspective)thinking way in the thesis.As a“strict science”,Husserl’s phenomenology embodies a“Raison attitude”which can contain irrational experience in terms of fact-oriented problems.