转型中国法官薪酬与遴选制度的微观激励基础

The Micro-Incentive Basis of the Judicial Compensation and Selection in Transitional China

以一种法官薪酬水平和法官遴选标准相互配合补充的制度组合视角观察,现代工商社会应该在法官管理制度中确定并落实高遴选标准和高薪酬水平的"双高"标准。改革开放四十多年来,中国法官的薪酬与遴选呈现出一种二元制度结构,即在法官薪酬水平与行政级别挂钩的基础上,虽然对法官的初次遴选越来越强调法官的专业化和职业化,但法院内部的职务晋升却呈现出强烈的行政化和关系依附性特征。在市场经济条件下,正是法官薪酬的地方化和行政化导致了比较严重的法官流失现象。由于法官高薪的制度前提必然是对法官高标准的严格遴选,在实践中,入选标准多元化和法官薪酬的双重分配机制使法官员额制改革还有进一步完善的制度空间。

Based on the view of interaction of judicial compensation and judicial selection system, modern society should select the judicial system including high judicial compensation level and high judicial selection standard. Since the reform and opening up, the compensation and selection of judges in China have shown a dual structure, that is, on the basis of the connection between the compensation of judges and the administrative level, although the initial selection of judges increasingly emphasizes the specialization and professionalization, the internal promotion within the court presented strong administration and individual affiliation. Under the condition of market economy, the localization and administration of judicial compensation level leads to the quitting of judges. Because the system premise of high salary for judges must be the strict selection of high standards for judges, in practice, the diversity of selection standard and the dual distribution mechanism of compensation make the reform of judge post system still have room for further improvement.