基于演化博弈的核安保内部威胁研究

Research on Insider Threat of Nuclear Security Based on Evolutionary Game

内部威胁是核安保面临的最严峻挑战之一。文章将等级依赖期望效用理论引入后处理厂内部威胁核安保事件中,构建以内部敌手和核安保部门为代表的博弈模型并求解,探讨情绪因素对内部敌手与核安保部门策略选择的影响。结合假设收益数值并进行仿真得出:不同情绪状态和情绪强度的组合不仅会影响最终的演化均衡结果,还会影响博弈双方策略演化的速度。此外,相比于内部敌手,核安保部门的悲观情绪强度对博弈均衡的影响更大。研究结果从加强情绪监督和疏导工作为后处理厂内部威胁核安保事件的预防和保护提供参考和借鉴。

The insider threat has become one of the most serious challenges to nuclear security.In order to study the influence of the emotional factor of insiders and nuclear security department on their strategic choices,the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility theory is introduced into the nuclear security against insider threats of a spent fuel reprocessing plant,and a game model represented by insiders and nuclear security department is constructed and solved.The simulation results show that different emotional states and intensities will not only affect the final result of evolutionary equilibrium,but also change the evolution speed of their strategies.In addition,compared with insiders,the intensity of pessimistic nuclear security department has a greater impact on the game equilibrium.Finally,there are some reasonable recommendations to prevent and protect nuclear security events at spent fuel reprocessing plant by strengthening the emotional supervision and guidance of insiders and nuclear security department.