PPP模式下政府与社会资本双边匹配博弈分析

Two-sided Matching Analysis Between the Government and the Social Capital in Public Private Partnership

近年来,公共服务领域的投资需求旺盛,政府投融资模式面临转型升级,PPP模式一度受到推广和发展。然而,当前PPP模式在我国推行遇冷,政府和社会资本存在逆向选择与低效匹配,双方合作需求难以得到充分满足,导致项目落地困难,市场总体情绪低落。本文运用双边匹配理论,分析PPP模式中政府方和社会资本方的合作博弈问题,基于双方匹配特征构建决策模型,对形成稳定结果的不同匹配机制进行分析。首先,从政府方与社会资本方的匹配动机、匹配偏好和匹配过程,分析影响匹配满意度的因素;其次,根据满意度评价建立Borda得分矩阵得到PPP项目双方匹配度矩阵,构建双边匹配决策模型;然后,对比匹配度最大化、双边得益最大化和有限满意度三种匹配机制的博弈结果;最后,通过实证算例分析,得出“双赢”的PPP项目匹配效率更高,设置隐性门槛不利于有效匹配等结论,并结合我国实践提出建议。

Nowadays,with the thriving demand for public investment and the upgrades of the government's financing pattern,the Public Private Partnership(PPP)mode has been promoted and developed over time.However,the implementation of PPP in China is not easy.There are adverse selection and inefficient matching between the government and the social capital.In practice,it's difficult to meet the cooperate demands from both sides,resulting in difficult implementation and market depression.By capturing matching characteristics of government and social capital,this paper uses two-sided matching theory to analyze the cooperative gaming in PPP projects and proposes different decision-making methods results in stable matches.This paper is developed in the following aspects:Firstly,this paper analyses factors that influences matching satisfaction from the perspective of both parties'motivation,preference and matching process.Secondly,this paper establishes the Borda score matrix to measure the matching degree based on satisfaction evaluation.Moreover,this paper constructs two-sided matching model for PPP's decision and compares the stable matching results under three different matching circumstances:maximum matching degree,maximum bilateral benefit and limited satisfaction situation.Finally,with empirical examples,this paper concludes that the matching efficiency of a"win-win"game is much higher than others.Setting the implicit threshold is not conducive to effective matching.The concerning advice is offered based on China's PPP practice.