外资持股与企业现金股利——基于现金股利业绩敏感性的视角

Foreign Shareholding and Dividend Policy——From the Perspective of Cash Dividend-Performance Sensitivity

本文实证研究外资持股对企业股利分配政策的影响,基于个体固定效应模型的回归结果显示,外资持股不仅提高了企业现金股利的分配水平,还降低了现金股利分配的业绩敏感性。这样的结果说明外资股东可能会推动企业在制定股利分配政策时脱离对实际盈利情况的考虑,从而分配更多的现金股利。进一步研究发现,外籍高管是外资股东影响企业股利分配政策制定的重要途径,而增加外资持股时长或国有股东控股都能对这种现象起到抑制作用。本文基于现金股利业绩敏感性的视角对外资在华股权投资的行为特点和投资心态的分析,可以为我国市场开放及外资引进提供经验证据和政策依据。

This paper studies the influence of foreign ownership on dividends and finds that foreign ownership significantly increases the dividends,and reduces the performance sensitivity of dividends.The regression results indicate that foreign shareholders may promote enterprises to pay more cash dividends with less consideration of profitability.We also find that appointing foreign executives is an important way for foreign shareholders to effect corporate policies,and their impact on dividends can be effectively suppressed when foreign shareholders invest in long-term or enterprises are controlled by state-owned shareholders.This paper studies the behavior characteristics of foreign shareholders in China from the perspective of cash dividend-performance sensitivity,which provides relevant empirical evidence and policy basis for market opening and foreign investment in China.