基于博弈论的滑坡灾害时空信息分流激励机制

Incentive Mechanism of Spatiotemporal Information Diversion of Landslide Disaster Based on Game Theory

为解决滑坡灾害时空信息在数据采集传输阶段的蜂窝系统流量过载、网络拥塞等问题,结合机会网络的特征,以贵州毕节地质滑坡灾害监测点为例,构建机会网络模型,提出一种基于博弈论的滑坡灾害时空信息分流激励机制。该机制利用三次讨价还价博弈,防止恶意节点的虚假报价,激励自私节点之间的合作。仿真实验结果显示,所提出的机制能够有效地激励成员间的协作,在恶意节点比例较高的初始条件下,亦能发挥出较好的协作性能和网络传输效果。

In order to solve the problems of cellular system traffic overload and network congestion in the stage of data collection and transmission of landslide spatiotemporal information,combined with the characteristics of opportunistic network,taking Bijie geological landslide disaster monitoring point in Guizhou as an example,an opportunistic network model was built,and an incentive mechanism of landslide spatiotemporal information diversion based on game theory is proposed.The mechanism uses three bargaining games to prevent false quotations from malicious nodes and encourage cooperation between selfish nodes.The simulation results show that the proposed mechanism can effectively stimulate the cooperation among members,and can also play a better cooperation performance and network transmission effect under the initial condition of high proportion of malicious nodes.