混合所有制改革对产业链定价策略影响的研究

The Effects of Mixed-ownership Reform on Pricing Strategies in the Industrial Chain

混合所有制改革是我国社会主义基本经济制度的重要实现形式,对我国经济高质量发展具有重要意义。本文基于产业链的垂直市场结构设计理论模型,从控制权角度探讨混合所有制企业中的国有持股比例与产业链中双重边际化现象的关系。研究表明,存在国有持股比例阈值,当国有持股比例高于阈值时,产业链中不会出现双重边际化现象,反之则相反。市场竞争状况影响产业链整体利润、上下游利润分配规则和市场需求规模,从而作用于该阈值,影响双重边际化。与水平市场结构相反,由于上下游产品间互补效应的存在,垂直市场结构中市场竞争程度越强时,双重边际化现象越易出现,该现象也越易阻碍产业链整体利润提升,在推进混合所有制改革时需要加以关注。因此,依据市场竞争指标设计混合所有制改革措施时,务必要严格区分水平或垂直市场,关注不同市场结构下竞争程度对政策实施后市场竞争均衡的不同影响。

This paper explores the relationship between the mixed-ownership reform and double marginalization in an industrial chain.The mixed-ownership reform is central to improving the domestic economy:its effective implementation can increase the operation efficiency of state-owned enterprises,and help the latter to better utilize their scale advantages to achieve high-quality economic development.Previous studies indicate that state-owned enterprises operating in highly competitive markets should be given priority for mixed-ownership reform.Note that this conclusion always holds in a market with a horizontal structure.In such a scenario,mixed-ownership reform for state-owned enterprises can achieve a higher level of welfare for both consumers and society as a whole.However,whether the conclusion still holds for a market with a vertical structure remains to be verified,and this will influence the effect of government policies regarding the reform for state-owned enterprises.The industrial chain is one of the most basic forms of an industrial organization,and with its efficient operation,resource allocation can be properly optimized among market entities in vertical relationships.Some adverse factors may arise in the working process of the industrial chain.A common one is double marginalization,which describes the phenomenon in which upstream and downstream enterprises both set prices higher than their marginal costs when they independently make production and sales decisions to maximize their profits.Economists find that the origin of double marginalization is that there may exist conflicts and divergence between the objectives of different market entities at different vertical levels,and,thus,how to weaken or eliminate double marginalization is an important issue in design and research for an industrial chain.Empirical studies find that the mixed-ownership reform for state-owned enterprises will affect the phenomenon of double marginalization in an industrial chain.Based on such facts,we set up theoretical models and focus on the impact of mixed-ownership reform measures on double marginalization,as well as on the efficiency of industrial chain,to allow state-owned enterprises to take full advantage of the effect of mixed-ownership reform and to achieve their dual objectives of profit and social responsibility.Our results demonstrate that the ratio of state-owned shareholdings has an important influence on double marginalization.A threshold value is obtained,and double marginalization emerges(vanishes)in an industrial chain only when the ratio of state-owned shareholdings is lower(higher)than this threshold value,leading to a low(high)level of social welfare.Meanwhile,the degree of product market competition,by impacting the size of customer demand and the profitability of enterprises in the industrial chain,determines the threshold of the optimal state-owned shareholding ratio.When the downstream market is less competitive,the upstream enterprises pays more attention to the coordination of efficiency for the overall chain,and the complementary effect between upstream and downstream products is stronger;then,the threshold becomes correspondingly lower,and double marginalization can effectively be avoided.However,when the downstream market is more competitive,the inconsistency in objectives between upstream and downstream enterprises becomes stronger,leading to a larger threshold value.Thus,it is easier for double marginalization to arise.This finding is in contrast to the finding on markets with horizontal structures,where the mixed-ownership reform enhances social welfare when the degree of product market competition is high.Hence,this paper stresses the importance of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical competitions in designing the optimal scheme of mixed-ownership reform.The government should focus on the market structure characteristics and differences of the relevant market when adopting the degree of market competition as the basis for decision-making or evaluation criteria in the design of mixed-ownership reform.