企业寻租如何影响审计意见购买?

How Does Enterprise Rent-seeking Affect Audit Opinion Shopping?

寻租企业为隐藏违规行为及由此产生的超额利润,有动机通过俘获外部审计师,弱化审计监督机制,降低会计信息透明度。本文以2007-2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,检验了企业寻租影响审计意见购买的行为逻辑。研究发现,寻租程度越高的企业,越倾向于购买审计意见;寻租企业更倾向于通过续聘现任审计师实现审计意见购买。从影响机制看,寻租企业操纵盈余的程度越高,则购买审计意见的意愿越强烈;寻租企业更倾向于通过提高审计费用的方式购买审计意见。进一步研究表明,无论是在企业层面、市场层面,还是在地区法治层面,寻租企业所处环境的治理体系与监督机制越严格,则对于清洁审计意见的购买动机越强。本文的研究结论为优化营商环境和强化审计市场监管提供了理论与经验证据支持。

Rent-seeking enterprises have an incentive to weaken the audit supervision mechanism by bribing the auditors, for hiding their illegal activities and excess profits. This paper takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample, testing the behavioral logic of enterprise rent-seeking influencing the audit opinion shopping. The study finds that companies with higher rent-seeking degrees are more inclined to shop audit opinions;and they are more likely to shop audit opinions by re-appointing current auditors. From the perspective of influence mechanism, the more rent-seeking companies manipulate their earnings, the stronger their willingness to shop audit opinions;rent-seeking companies are more inclined to shop audit opinions by increasing audit fees. Further research shows that whether it is at the enterprise level, the market level, or the law level, the stricter the governance system and supervision mechanism of the environment in which rent-seeking companies are located, the stronger the demand for clean audit opinions. This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence support for optimizing the business environment and strengthening audit market supervision.