考虑需求交叉弹性的多对一型供应链中制造商联盟定价决策问题

Manufacturer Optimal Alliance Pricing Decision in Many to One Supply Chain with Cross Elasticity of Demand Taken into Account

以两个差异化制造商和一个共同零售商组成的多对一型供应链系统为对象,从需求交叉弹性视角,探讨多对一型供应链中制造商联盟定价决策问题。研究表明:对于制造商而言,在互补型供应链中,当负向需求交叉弹性效应较低时,纵向联盟定价是占优策略;反之,集中联盟定价是占优策略,且均能实现帕累托改进。在竞争型供应链中,当正向需求交叉弹性效应较低时,集中联盟定价是占优策略;反之,横向联盟定价是占优策略,但零售商与消费者利益均将受到损害,难以实现帕累托改进。

This paper explores the cooperative pricing decisions problem for two related products in a two-echelon supply chain that consists of two manufacturers and one common retailer from the perspective of cross elasticity of demand.The results indicate that:for manufacturers,in the complementary supply chain,the vertical alliance pricing is the optimal strategy when the cross elasticity effect of negative demand is low;otherwise,the centralized alliance pricing is the dominant strategy.These two strategies both can achieve Pareto improvement.In the competitive supply chain,the centralized alliance pricing is an optimal strategy when the cross elasticity effect of positive demand is low;otherwise,the horizontal alliance pricing is the dominant strategy,but both retailers and consumers’profit will suffer,the Pareto improvement cannot be obtained.