金融抑制、国企改革与财政货币政策协调

Financial Repression, SOE Reform and Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination

本文构建了一个具有金融抑制的动态随机一般均衡模型,并结合宏观经济数据进行估计和模拟分析,详细讨论了当经济中存在国企市场势力较强和金融抑制的特征时,货币政策与财政政策对宏观经济的作用机制以及最优政策组合。本文发现:在现有的经济背景下,财政政策应当在稳定产出中发挥更大的作用,而货币政策则应该更加侧重关注通胀。尽管民企"融资贵、融资难"的问题与金融抑制有关,但在国企市场势力较强的现实条件下,金融抑制是一种次优的制度安排,可以用更低的融资成本促进国企产出,在一定程度上抵消国企市场势力较强带来的效率损失。此外,我们还通过政策试验发现,如果推动国企改革降低其市场势力,金融抑制失去了存在的意义,那时最优的财政政策可以减小对经济波动的反应。

We build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with financial repression and conduct estimation and simulation with it using aggregate data. We discuss the interaction and optimal combination of fiscal and monetary policies when the model features SOE monopoly and financial repression. We find that under current situation, fiscal policy should play a bigger role in stabilizing output, while monetary policy ought to pay more attention to combatting inflation. Although private firms’ limited access to credit can be attributed to financial repression and SOE monopoly, financial repression is a second-best policy, in that it promotes SOE’s output via cheap credit when SOEs behave like monopolists. This in turn, offsets the efficiency loss associated with monopoly. Moreover, our policy experiments show that optimal fiscal policy can respond less to output fluctuation, when SOE reforms dampen the significance of financial repression.