期刊文献+

An attack-immune trusted architecture for supervisory aircraft hardware 被引量:2

原文传递
导出
摘要 With the wide application of electronic hardware in aircraft such as air-to-ground communication,satellite communication,positioning system and so on,aircraft hardware is facing great secure pressure.Focusing on the secure problem of aircraft hardware,this paper proposes a supervisory control architecture based on secure System-on-a-Chip(So C)system.The proposed architecture is attack-immune and trustworthy,which can support trusted escrow application and Dynamic Integrity Measurement(DIM)without interference.This architecture is characterized by a Trusted Monitoring System(TMS)hardware isolated from the Main Processor System(MPS),a secure access channel from TMS to the running memory of the MPS,and the channel is unidirectional.Based on this architecture,the DIM program running on TMS is used to measure and call the Lightweight Measurement Agent(LMA)program running on MPS.By this method,the Operating System(OS)kernel,key software and data of the MPS can be dynamically measured without disturbance,which makes it difficult for adversaries to attack through software.Besides,this architecture has been fully verified on FPGA prototype system.Compared with the existing systems,our architecture achieves higher security and is more efficient on DIM,which can fully supervise the running of application and aircraft hardware OS.
出处 《Chinese Journal of Aeronautics》 SCIE EI CAS CSCD 2021年第11期169-181,共13页 中国航空学报(英文版)
基金 supported by the National Key Research and Development Program of China(No.2017YFB0802502) by the Aeronautical Science Foundation(No.2017ZC51038) by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.62002006,61702028,61672083,61370190,61772538,61532021,61472429,and 61402029) by the Foundation of Science and Technology on Information Assurance Laboratory(No.1421120305162112006) by the National Cryptography Development Fund(No.MMJJ20170106) by the Defense Industrial Technology Development Program(No.JCKY2016204A102) by the Liaoning Collaboration Innovation Center For CSLE,China。
  • 相关文献

参考文献1

二级参考文献11

  • 1Trusted Computing Group. TCG PC client specific implementation specification for conventional bios version 1.2, July 2005.
  • 2Apvrille A, Gordon D, Hallyn S, Pourzandi M, and Roy V. DigSig: Run-time authentication of binaries at kernel Level[C]. Proceedings of LISA '04 Eighteenth Systems Administration Conference. Atlanta, GA, USENIX Association November, 2004: 59-66.
  • 3Petroni N Jr and Fraser T, et al.. Copilot - A coprocessor -based kernel runtime integrity monitor[C]. Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium. San Diego, CA, 2004, Vol. 13: 13-13.
  • 4Sailer R, Zhang Xiao-lan, Jaeger T, and Van Doorn L. Design and implementation of a TCG-based integrity : architecture[C]. Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium. Lake Tahoe, California, USA, ACM Press, Aug. 2004: 223-238.
  • 5Jaeger T, Sailer R, and Shankar U. PRIMA: Policy-reduced integrity t architecture[C]. Proceedings of the eleventh ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies. Lake Tahoe, California, USA, 2006: 19-28.
  • 6Shi E, Perrig A, and Van Doorn L. BIND: A fine-grained attestation service for secure distributed systems[C]. Proceeding of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. Oakland, CA, USA, IEEE Press, 2005: 154-168.
  • 7Loscocco P A, Wilson P W, Pendergrass J A, and McDonell C D. Linux kernel integrity measurement using contextual inspection[C]. Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing. Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2007 21-29.
  • 8Thober M and Pendergrass J A. McDonell C D: Improving coherency of runtime integrity measurement[C]. Conference on Computer and Communications Security Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing. Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2008: 51-60.
  • 9Gu Liang, Ding Xu-hua, Deng R H, Xie Bing, and Mei Hong. Remote attestation on program execution[C]. Conference on Computer and Communications Security Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Scalable trusted computing. Alexandria, Virginia, USA, 2008: 11-20.
  • 10Wu Yong-dong, Zhao Zhi-gang, and Chui Tian-wei. An attack on SMC-based software protection[M]. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg. 2007: 232-248.

共引文献46

同被引文献11

引证文献2

二级引证文献6

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部